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Abstract
We investigate whether characteristics of the home country capital market environment, such as
information disclosure and investor rights protection, continue to affect ADRs cross-listed in the U.S.
Using microstructure measures as proxies for adverse selection, we find that characteristics of the home
markets continue to be relevant, especially for emerging market firms. Less transparent disclosure,
poorer protection of investor rights, and weaker legal institutions are associated with higher levels of
information asymmetry. Developed market firms appear to be affected by whether or not home business
laws are of common law or civil law legal origin. To further understand the persistence of the home
capital market effect, we find that regulatory effectiveness is an important determinant. The home cap-
ital market environment effect becomes weaker for emerging market firms after the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The bid-ask spread, as a measure of adverse-selection cost, increases two years
into a cross-listing, and stays high for emerging market ADRs. Our finding contributes to the bonding
literature. It suggests that cross-listing in the U.S. should not be viewed as a complete substitute for
improvement in the quality of local institutions, and attention must be paid to improve investor pro-
tection in order to achieve the full benefit of improved disclosure. Improvement in the domestic capital
market environment can attract more investors even for U.S. cross-listed firms. It also suggests that regu-
latory tightening in the U.S. has a bigger effect on emerging market ADRs than developed market ADRs.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Codes: F21, F36, F55, G14, G15, G32.
Keywords: Information Asymmetry, Disclosure, Governance, Cross-Listing.
1 Introduction
This article examines whether characteristics of the home-country capital market environment, such as in-
formation disclosure and investor rights protection, continue to be relevant for foreign firms cross-listed on
U.S. exchanges. It is well documented that foreign firms improve their information disclosure and corporate
governance after cross-listed in the U.S. The effectiveness of the improvement over the long run, however,
is less well-understood. We find that less transparent disclosure, poorer protection of investor rights, and
weaker legal institutions in the countries of origin are associated with higher level of adverse selection in
ADRs, especially for firms from emerging markets. Poor home capital market environment increases the av-
erage bid-ask spread by 10% with one standard deviation in disclosure quality, and the effect is economically
significant. In our further analysis, we find that information quality of emerging market ADRs deteriorate
years after they are first cross-listed, and that the regulatory stingingness has a big impact on these firms.
Our finding illustrates that cross-listing in the United States is not a substitute for improvement of local
information transparency and protection of minority shareholders.
Foreign issuers are subject to U.S. securities laws concerning disclosures and procedures for equity
issuances and are required to reconcile their accounting statements with U.S. GAAP (using form 20-F).
Some studies (e.g., Coffee Jr (1999), Stulz (1999), Reese and Weisbach (2002)) argue that cross-listing in
the U.S. serves as a substitute for weak investor protection laws in the home country. Extending that logic,
foreign firms can also bond themselves to stricter disclosure requirements and stricter enforcement in the
U.S. in order to achieve a better information environment and attract investors who would otherwise be
reluctant to invest.
A growing body of empirical research have tested the bonding hypothesis. Doidge (2004), for example,
finds that the premium between voting and non-voting shares declines following cross-listing, an indication
that minority investors become better protected. Reese and Weisbach (2002) interpret the frequency and
location of equity offerings that follow cross-listing as evidence of firms from weak investor protection
countries seeking to bond with the U.S. security regime. Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) find that cross-
listed firms achieve greater analyst coverage with improved forecast accuracy, and Bailey, Karolyi, and
Salva (2006) find evidence of higher liquidity. Other studies find that an enhancement in the shareholder
protection and information environment, in turn, is associated with higher valuation of the cross-listed firm
(Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), and Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2006)).
The bonding hypothesis largely deals with the motivation and immediate consequence of ADR cross-
listing. The question however remains whether bonding is sufficient enough to transform U.S. listed foreign
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firms to be equally transparent regardless of the differences in the home capital market environment. There
is also the question of how effective firms can transcend their home capital market environment after they
are cross-listed in the long run, especially given the evidence that long-run return performances of ADR
offerings are less than stellar (Foerster and Karolyi (2000), Bancela, Kalimipallib, and Mittooc (2009)).
This paper seeks to shed some light on this question.
There are several possible reasons why bonding might not be totally effective. First, regulation and
enforcement of U.S. corporate laws might not be as stringent for foreign firms. Foreign issuers can obtain
exemptions from various disclosure requirements of exchanges and regulators. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the U.S. stock exchanges and the SEC are not as stringent with foreign firms in enforcing listing
standards. Siegel (2005) argues that the lack of effective law enforcement by the SEC and minority share-
holders against cross-listed foreign firms adds to the ineffectiveness of regulatory bonding. Further, rules
governing corporate bankruptcy and derivative actions against foreign insiders are based on the laws in the
companies’ home country. Second, mechanisms to credibly commit a firm to higher-quality information
disclosure and governance may be unavailable or prohibitively expensive in countries with poor investor
protection and insufficient economic development (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006), Ball (2001)). Ball
(2001) argues that changing accounting standards alone is not enough to improve actual financial reporting
and disclosure. Third, if firms want to misrepresent their information within the U.S. regulation, they have
varieties of means to do so. They can for example, engage in earnings smoothing, aggressive accounting, or
loss avoidance (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006)).
Even when bonding is effective, it is conceivable that the home capital market environment still plays an
important role in cross-sectional differences in information asymmetry of cross-listed foreign firms. First,
many disclosure practices are voluntary. SEC and other regulatory rules mean to serve as a floor for neces-
sary reporting. In practice, companies can, and may in fact desire to, disclose more than what SEC regula-
tion requires. Therefore, actual levels of voluntary disclosure may differ for firms from different markets.1
Second, firms from different countries may have different costs and benefits in implementing measures to
improve governance and transparency. Hence, their incentives to increase the level of voluntary disclosure
and to bond through reputation mechanism may differ. The incentive to improve is low if, for example, there
are large controlling blocks of shares and minority investors are not well protected, or when a firm is diffi-
cult to effectively differentiate itself because the home market information environment is poor. Third, even
when all necessary information is disclosed, it takes effort to decipher and disseminate useful information.
1Voluntary disclosures can also be a source of information manipulation. See, for example, Brockman, Khurana, and Martin
(2008).
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This is more challenging for firms from less transparent home markets. Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) argue
that U.S.-based analysts are less likely to follow non-U.S. firms with large family or management-owned
controlling blocks of shares, especially for companies with weak legal protections in the home market. It
is also possible that the added reporting and disclosure required by regulators for cross-listing could crowd
out or substitute for the collection of private information (Kim and Verrecchia (2001)).
There is evidence that institutional features of the local environment find their way into U.S. cross-
listed firms. Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) show that U.S. cross-listed firms report financial information
systematically differently than equivalent U.S. firms despite the fact that all firms use the same accounting
standards. Foreign firms recognize losses in a less timely manner and generally report more smoothed
earnings. Therefore, a cross-listed firm’s home environment continues to be relevant in explaining the quality
of its U.S. GAAP reported earnings. Doidge et al. (2006) find country characteristics are significant for
ADR firms, especially for those from emerging markets. Bailey et al. (2006) report cross-sectional evidence
in volume and volatility that suggests cross-listed firms from emerging markets have lower information
quality. Ferreira and Fernandes (2008) show the improvement in price informativeness after cross-listing is
concentrated in developed market firms; cross-listing is negatively associated with price informativeness in
emerging market firms.
In this paper, we examine the cross-section of the information asymmetry surrounding ADR firms, and
relate it to information disclosure quality, governance, and rule of law measures of the countries in which
those firms are domiciled. We utilize market microstructure proxies to measure information asymmetry.
Market microstructure measures of information asymmetry are designed to capture adverse selection be-
tween informed traders and uninformed traders. Since the firm managers and those close to them constitute
an important subset of informed traders in the market, market microstructure measures should capture ad-
verse selection faced by ADR firms, albeit imperfectly. More importantly, those proxies capture the financial
market’s perception of information advantage held by firm insiders and the resulting adverse selection cost.
Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) use microstructure proxies to establish the relationship between infor-
mation asymmetry and capital structure decisions. Heflin, Shaw, and Wild (2005) find that there is a negative
association between disclosure quality and bid-ask-spread-based measures of information asymmetry in the
U.S. stock market. Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) examines after-listing trading cost, namely the
bid-ask spreads of ADRs, and find that improvement in legal and political institutions can lower the cost of
liquidity for ADRs. Our study is different from their’s in several important ways. We focus primarily on the
effect of information environment on adverse selection cost. To that end, we decompose bid-ask spread into
an adverse-selection component and non-information component, and we use non-spread-based measure of
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information asymmetry to confirm out findings. Our tests are more restrictive in a sense that we control for
the firm-specific characteristics related to information asymmetry, which would bias against finding home
capital market environment effect. While we confirm their finding of the impact legal institutions, we also
find that the direct impact of information disclosure exists even after controlling for legal institution and
corporate governance. Second, in stead of focusing on high-frequency spread measures in a short period
of time, we study annual average of (daily) adverse-selection measures over a long period of time.2 The
longer horizon confirms that the home capital market environment effect is not a short term fab. It also gives
us opportunity to study the time dynamics of information quality and gain some insight into why the home
capital market environment would still matter for ADR firms.
We start with investigating the effect of home country financial information opaqueness, since it is a
direct concern as a source of adverse selection. A less transparent information environment can not only
lead to a firm’s poor disclosure practice, but also downgrade the market’s perception about the quality of
its disclosure. We also include legal and governance measures in our investigation of adverse selection.
Although there are distinctions between financial opaqueness and poor protection of investors, a country’s
financial opaqueness is often coupled, and mutually reinforced, with imperfect protection of shareholder
rights and poor corporate governance. Moreover, as discussed above, investor protection and corporate
governance can influence a firm’s incentive to adhere to a high level of information disclosure, and ultimately
affect adverse selection costs.3 Thus, we include legal institution and corporate governance variables not
only as control variables to investigate whether home country financial transparency remains as a significant
factor of adverse selection for ADR firms, but also to examine their direct impact on information asymmetry.
Our primary empirical results indicate that the home market environment still matters for adverse se-
lection of non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. ADRs of firms from countries with greater finan-
cial opaqueness, poorer investor protection and weaker corporate governance experience a higher degree
of adverse selection, especially when issued by firms from emerging markets. Among those emerging
market firms, both quoted bid-ask spreads and effective spreads are negatively correlated with the quality-
of-disclosure and governance proxies. Among firms from developed markets, there is weaker evidence
that poorer home country information transparency and firm governance lead to bigger quoted spreads. In-
stead, legal origin of business laws (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)) appears to
be a consistent and significant factor in their level of adverse selection. To extract the adverse selection
2Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) use intraday data covering three months from January to March 2002. As described
later, our primary sample covers from year 1995 to 2006.
3Miller and Reisel (2009) find that countries legal investor protections impact the design of public securities issued aboard.
Restrictive covenants are more prevalent in bonds issued by firms located in countries with weak creditor rights, less disclosure and
poor shareholder rights.
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in our spread proxy, we also decompose quoted spreads into an asymmetric-information component and
a non-information component. We find that the asymmetric-information component of spreads exhibits a
negative relation with domicile market transparency and governance, especially for emerging market firms.
It reinforces the idea that our microstructure measure does indeed capture the information quality of ADR
firms. Our results complement Ferreira and Fernandes’ (2008) event study finding that cross-listing does not
improve price informativeness for emerging market firms. We also provide some evidence that the “home
country risk” is priced by the market. Abnormal return is larger for firms from countries of less information
transparency and weaker institution quality.
Our inferences appear to be quite robust. We control our empirical regressions of the market condition
and individual firm characteristics. Given that many firm-level controls such as size, leverage, and the book-
to-market ratio are possibly correlated with level of information asymmetry, and might be correlated with
country-level information environment, our tests are actually biased against finding an additional adverse
selection component. We also augment our tests with analyst coverage and forecast dispersion, which prior
research indicates are associated with a firm’s disclosure and information environment (e.g., Lang and Lund-
holm (1996)). Our results withstand those controls. To alleviate concern about home market information
transparency measure, we confirm our primary findings with several other proxies of disclosure environment
including a time-varying measure of information environment advocated by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000),
and Jin and Myers (2006).4 We also confirm our empirical tests with several statistical methods. Finally,
to further substantiate our interpretation of spread-based proxies as a measurement of adverse selection,
we conduct our tests utilizing an alternative proxy derived by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002)
that is not spread-based. The results of the alternative dependent variable show that the proxy of adverse
selection is negatively correlated with home market transparency and better governance for emerging mar-
ket sub-sample, but not for developed market firms. There are several possible explanations for the finding
that developed market firms show less evidence of a relation between the home market environment and
the adverse selection in ADRs than emerging market firms. Disclosure measures may not capture capital
market characteristics among developed market firms; the cost of adopting better disclosure and governance
practice may be small enough for developed market firms to bond themselves more effectively.
To understand the home capital market environment effect better, we then investigate how the tightening
of regulatory rules affects the significance of the home capital market environment effect. When regulatory
floor is raised, we should see a lower level of adverse selection, and further, the impact should be bigger
4We also check our results with disclosure index used by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) and ”business extent
of information disclosure” in 2006 published by world bank. Our results remain robust to these alternative disclosure measures.
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for firms whose disclosure and governance practices are closer to the regulatory floor. Indeed, the passage
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 30, 2002 reduces the home capital market effect and has the biggest impact
on emerging market firms. We also look into the dynamics of the bid-ask spreads over time of listing. We
examine how the vintages of listing affect the spread, after controlling for yearly averages. On average, the
bid-ask spread goes up significantly in the second and third year after it was first listed, and it remains at a
higher level for emerging market firms.
Our finding that the home capital market environment continues to act as a crucial factor in the adverse
selection of ADR firms, especially for those from emerging markets, has important policy implications. It
illustrates that cross-listing in the United States is not a substitute for the improvement of local informa-
tion transparency and the protection of minority shareholders. In a recent study, Ammer, Holland, Smith,
and Warnock (2008) document that if everything else is equal, cross-listing has a smaller impact on U.S.
investors’ holdings for firms from countries with weaker shareholder protection. Our findings help explain
such a home bias in ADR holdings. Therefore, governments and policymakers should still focus on pro-
moting information disclosure and improving corporate governance in order to attract capital flows to their
countries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides discussion on
some institutional backgrounds. Section 3 empirically investigates the relation between ADR information
asymmetry and home market environments. Section 4 provides evidences to the understand why home
capital market environment still influences ADR firms. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
In this section, we describe sample selection and the institutional background, the measurement of firm-
specific adverse selection and the home country capital market environment, and the control variables used
in this study.
2.1 Sample Selection
To construct a uniform testing sample, we need to restrict our firms to similar institutional requirements.
Different choices of listing type have different institutional requirements. Non-U.S. companies to be listed
in the U.S. are required to file a registration statement with the SEC and furnish an annual report on a
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Form 20-F with reconciliation with U.S. GAAP. Level I ADRs trade over-the-counter and require only
minimal SEC disclosure and no GAAP reconciliation (exempt from Form 20-F by Rule 12g3-2(b)). Level
II and III ADRs are exchange-listed securities and they require full SEC disclosure and compliance with the
exchange’s own listing rules. Level III programs raise capital and must file Form F-2 and F-3 for offerings.
Finally, SEC Rule 144a issues raise capital as private placements to qualified institutional buyers and do not
require compliance with GAAP.5 Ordinary listings require an exact replication of settlement facilities as for
U.S. securities and go beyond Level II and Level III ADRs in requiring full annual and quarterly reports
prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. We focus on level II and III ADRs to ensure uniform regulatory
disclosure requirements. We identify our sample of exchange-listed ADR firms on NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq
from Bank of New York and other sources. To the extent that level II and III ADRs are subject to stricter
disclosure requirements than level I and Rule 144a issuances, our sample is biased against finding a home
market effect.
We restrict our sample of ADRs to issues that occurred no earlier than 1990, and collect their price and
volume information between 1994 and the end of 2006. The purpose of our restriction on issuance and price
data is two-fold. First, foreign issuances become more active in the 1990s due to conscious effort by the
U.S. to attract foreign issues and financial liberalization in other parts of the world; further, most emerging
market ADRs are issued after 1990, and most emerging markets do not have local stock market indices
until after 1994. An ADR issued earlier is more likely to be localized by the U.S. market. More important,
most of our disclosure measures are time-invariant, and are constructed with data from late 1990s and early
2000s. Our restriction is to keep the data relevant to the question we study. Instead of focusing on a limited
period of time (e.g., Lang et al. (2003)), we examine the whole period of time when most price information
is available. We also drop ADRs for which institutional data is not available.6 We end up with 355 firms
from 36 countries over 13 years.
To avoid drawing spurious inferences from extreme values and to filter out errors in the data, we win-
sorize observations in the top and bottom 5% of the asymmetric information measure and firm size over the
whole sample period. Also the availability of the specific control variables such as the number of analyst
coverage might differ, so the number of observations for each individual regression may vary.
5It may be that a firm that accesses the U.S. markets by way of a Rule 144a private placement or OTC listing, which require little
or no conformity with U.S. GAAP, actually chooses to disclose more because it anticipates a subsequent upgrade to an exchange
listing at some later point. Similarly, a firm that chose to list its shares for trading on the NYSE or Nasdaq may have anticipated
doing so for some time before and thus had chosen to present its financial statements voluntarily in accordance with IAS or U.S.
GAAP in the years before the U.S. listing.
6We do not include cross-listings from Canada, which are unique in their regulatory requirements. See Jordan (2006) for details.
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Stock price and return data is from CRSP and Datastream. Non-U.S. Market returns and volatility are
calculated based on Datastream total market indices. Firm accounting data is from Compustat. Analyst
forecast data is from IBES.
2.2 Home Capital Market Environment
We use several measures to characterize the information environment of the capital market of a country.
Financial transparency measures capture the intensity and the timeliness of financial disclosures, and their
interpretation and dissemination by analysts. We draw our main proxy of disclosure, GCRSCORE, from
The Global Competitiveness Reports, which includes results from surveys about the level and effectiveness
of financial disclosure in different countries. The respondents were asked to assess the statement “The level
of financial disclosure required is extensive and detailed” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree), as well as to assess “availability of information” on the same scale. For each country, we take the
average over responses to the two questions in the 2000 survey and form a disclosure score GCRSCORE.
Higher values of GCRSCORE indicate higher degree of information transparency of home markets of
ADR issuing firms. The advantage of this survey-based proxy is that it is possible to reflect variations in
information disclosure beyond those stipulated in the accounting rules. This is most relevant for emerging
markets where existing regulations on the book are not always properly enforced. Jin and Myers (2006)
show that this survey-based measure works quite well as a proxy for financial transparency of the markets.
We also use an accounting-based index to augment GCRSCORE disclosure measure, and to ensure
the robustness of our results. The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR (1995))
reports for each country a disclosure index that represents a score based on the inclusion or omission of 90
items as required disclosures in the annual reports, with low scores indicating poor accounting standards.
These items fall into seven categories: general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow
statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items. We denote this index as CIFAR.7
Figure 1 charts the values of CIFAR and GCRSCORE (scaled by 10 times) for countries in our
sample. GCRSCORE ranges from 3.8, of China, to 6.4, of Finland, with a median of 5.65, about the level
of disclosure for Ireland. CIFAR ranges from the lowest score of 56 for Brazil, to the highest score of
85 for the U.K., with a median of 73, the score for Hong Kong. CIFAR covers slightly fewer countries
7In our unreported robustness check, we also use disclosure scores reported by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006)
and the World Bank, respectively.
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(31) than GCRSCORE (34), and covers fewer emerging markets. Numbers of ADRs from each country
covered in our sample are also reported in Figure 1.
A country’s financial opaqueness is often coupled with imperfect protection of shareholder rights and
poor corporate governance. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between opaqueness and poor protection
of investors, which can affect firms’ incentive to voluntary disclose. We thus include legal institution and
corporate governance variables, not only to investigate whether those remain as important factors in de-
termining degree of information asymmetry in ADRs, but also to check whether our disclosure variables
remain significant after controlling for the shareholder protection.
We use an index of anti-director rights compiled by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(henceforth, LLSV)(1998), denoted ANTIDIR, to proxy for strength of corporate governance. It mea-
sures the ability of shareholders in a country to challenge managers or dominant shareholders in the cor-
porate decision-making process. It ranges from zero to six, with higher score representing better investor
protection. LLSV (1998) show that ANTIDIR is a reasonable proxy for investor rights protection. When
applicable, we employ a dummy variable CIV IL, which equals one if the home market legal rules are of
Civil Law origin, and zero if legal rules regarding investor rights are of Common Law origin. LLSV (1998)
show that, broadly speaking, common law countries afford the best legal protections to shareholders.
Table 1 reports the Spearman rank correlations among the disclosure and governance measures, as well
as the summary statistics of each measure. It shows that the disclosure measures and the governance proxy
are positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with the civil law dummy. The survey-
based disclosure measure GCRSCORE and accounting-based disclosure measure CIFAR have a high
correlation of 0.69. The governance measure ANTIDIR and legal origin are more correlated with each
other than with disclosure measures in terms of magnitude. Correlation coefficient between ANTIDIR
and CIV IL is −0.64, it is 0.13 between ANTIDIR and GCRSCORE, and 0.36 between ANTIDIR
and CIFAR.
Notice that our home environment measures are time-invariant, but our sample spans over several years.
Fortunately, institutional quality variables are relatively stable, and are very slow to change. Nevertheless,
to check the robustness of our results, we also use a time-varying measure of home country information
environment following Jin and Myers (2006). The details of that alternative measure will be explained in
the next section.
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2.3 Asymmetric Information
Information asymmetry measures at the firm level are notoriously hard to estimate and lack accuracy. Re-
searchers have used IBES analyst dispersion of estimates, earning surprises, or firm’s accounting discrep-
ancies to proxy for it, with varying degrees of success. We use market microstructure measures to proxy
for the degree of adverse selection. Specifically, we first examine bid-ask spreads of ADRs. The presence
of traders who possess superior knowledge of the value of a stock can impose adverse selection costs on
liquidity traders and market makers. Bid-ask spread compensates liquidity providers for bearing this cost
and increases with degree of information asymmetry. Previous research finds the bid-ask spread to be a
reasonable proxy for information asymmetry. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), for example show firms
with lower spreads have a lower degree of information asymmetry or adverse selection costs.
We calculate the quoted spread in percentage terms with daily data as
S = 100 ∗ (askprice− bidprice)/1
2
(askprice+ bidprice), (1)
We then take the yearly average to obtain an average quoted spread, QS, for each stock every year.
The first column of Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the average quoted spread across all sample
firms as well as across groups that are formed by the measures of disclosure and institutional quality. Quoted
spread has a mean of 1.71 (percent), and a wide variation across firms and years with a standard deviation
of 1.47. Firms from markets of lower GCRSCORE, lower CIFAR, lower ANTIDIR, and firms from
countries of civil law origin and emerging markets all have relatively higher QS. We note that the finding
that firms from civil law countries have higher QS is consistent with the findings in LLSV (1998) that
civil law origin countries offer weaker legal protection of investor rights. The differences in the means of
sub-samples are all significant except that of different GCRSCOREs. This gives us a first indication that
QS of ADRs, and hence the degree of information asymmetry, is dependent on the information and legal
environment of the home countries.
Quoted spread has components other than asymmetric-information reasons such as inventory, transac-
tion, and order-processing costs. George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) show a method of unbiasedly
estimating the adverse selection component of a stock’s spread by exploiting different stock return auto-
correlations of uninformed trading and informational speculation. In light of this consideration, we also
estimate the adverse selection component of the quoted spread and substitute that as the dependent variable,
following George et al. (1991) and Bharath et al. (2009).
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To substantiate our interpretation that quoted spread differences reflect the degree of information asym-
metry of ADRs, we also test for the presence of a home environment effect using an alternative non-spread-
based dependent variable that measures the relative importance of information-driven trading in stocks’ price
fluctuations. Llorente et al. (2002) show theoretically and empirically that accounting for the intensity of
trading volume accompanying stock return autocorrelation can help identify the extent of informed trading.
We develop our alternative proxy following their methodology. Specifically, we estimate
rit(τ) = c0it + c1itrit(τ − 1) + c2itTit(τ − 1)rit(τ − 1) + εit(τ), (2)
for each firm i in year t, where rit is the stock return of ADR i in year t, τ is an indicator for days in year
t, Tit(τ) is the natural logarithm of the daily turnover detrended by its mean over the past 200 observations.
The measure of informed trading is given by the coefficients c2it, yielding one observation for each firm-year.
For firms with considerable information asymmetry, c2it tends to be positive, as more volume indicates more
speculative trading and the stock exhibits positive return autocorrelation. For firms with low information
asymmetry, c2it tends to be negative, as more volume indicates liquidity-based (or noise) trading and the
return exhibits negative autocorrelation. The lower (higher) is the estimated c2it, the lower (higher) is firm
i’s degree of adverse selection.
2.4 Control Variables
We include a variety of firm characteristics variables to control for the cross-section of individual firm
idiosyncrasy, including firm size, asset tangibility, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio.
SIZEit is defined as the logarithmic of firm i’s total asset in year t, DTAit is the debt-to-asset ratio,
MTBit is the market-to-book ratio, TANGit is the tangibility of firm assets, defined as the ratio of firm’s
tangible assets (Property, Plant and Equipment Total, Compustat fundamental data item PPENT) to total
assets.
Our firm characteristics variables are all possibly related to the degree of information asymmetry of
firms. Smaller firms are likely to have more severe information asymmetry problems. A firm with relatively
less tangible assets, ceteris paribus, is expected to have a higher degree of information asymmetry. Low
MTB also may reflect more severe information problems between managers and investors. LLSV (2002)
show that firms with better investor protection have higher valuation relative to their assets, i.e., higher MTB.
If information asymmetry is an important determinant of a firm’s debt issuance decisions, then its cumulative
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effect, leverage, is likely to be higher for firms facing more severe information problems. Since our main
interest is to test whether the home country information disclosure and governance environment have an
effect on the information asymmetry of ADRs, controlling for the firm characteristics helps control for the
firm level idiosyncrasy. Since firm characteristics are possibly endogenous to country-level characteristics,
adding those controls will bias against finding a home market effect.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the firm-level control variables, along with the means of the
firm-level control variables for sub-samples of firms according to whether home market disclosure and
governance measures are above or below the medians, or whether firms are from emerging or developed
markets. It reports the p-value of T-test of difference in means in parentheses. On average, ADRs from
emerging markets, compared with those from developed markets, are slightly smaller (but the difference is
not significant), have significantly higher proportion of tangible assets, and have significantly higher leverage
ratio and lower MTB. ADRs from more transparent markets and markets of better investor rights protection,
as well as ADRs from countries of common law origin, are noticeably smaller in size, have significantly less
tangibility, and have comparatively higher MTB ratio. Except for comparison across ANTIDIR subgroups,
they also appear to have comparatively lower level of leverages, although the differences are not significant.
These features in the data are consistent with the hypothesis that higher disclosure level and better corporate
governance of home markets allow ADR issuers to keep a lower level of tangible assets. Relatively lower
level of leverage and higher market-to-book ratio of those firms indicate comparatively smaller degree of
information asymmetry.
Many authors have used analyst-following data to proxy for the firm-level information environment
(e.g., Lang et al. (2003)). We include two variables calculated from IBES data to make for additional firm-
level controls. NUMANALY S is measured as the number of analysts following in the annual consensus
IBES forecast. DISPERSION is the dispersion of analyst EPS forecasts measured as standard deviation
of analysts forecasts in months of calendar year prior to the end of fiscal year, and normalized by absolute
value of realized EPS and square root of the number of analysts.8 While higher forecast dispersion is
generally believed to be associated with higher degree of information asymmetry,9 the relation between
analyst following and information asymmetry is less conclusive in the literature. A priori, we do not have
expectations of how NUMANALY S or DISPERSION is related to adverse selection, and control for
it only to the extent that it may affect an ADR firm’s information environment.
8We follow Jin and Myers (2006)) in constructing analyst forecast dispersion.
9When information production is possible, more potential private information can be discovered and traded upon when there is
greater uncertainty regarding future earnings. However, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) show that the increased uncertainty makes it
more costly to discover and profit from private information.
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We include year dummies to control for time-specific variations. We also include U.S. and local market
volatility, measured as standard deviation of daily returns calculated from market indices (in percentages),
to control for possible correlation between market volatility and ADR liquidity.
3 Empirical Analysis
We are interested in whether the home market information and governance environment continue to be
relevant factors in asymmetric information of ADR firms that are subject to SEC regulation and U.S. GAAP
reporting. We estimate the following regression model:
ASijt = γ0 + γ1HCMEj + γ2Xjt + γ3Xijt + µt + υijt, (3)
where ASijt is the adverse selection measure of firm i from country j in year t, HCMEj is the institutional
variables of market j where firm i is domiciled, Xjt is a set of market-level control variables that include
volatility of U.S. and home markets, Xijt is a set of firm-level control variables, and µt is a set of year
dummy variable to control for the decrease of adverse section measures over time.10 All panel test statistics
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with robust errors. We also check our estimation with
cluster regression errors, which yield very similar results.11
We pay special attention to the information disclosure environment, since intense and timely financial
disclosures, including interpretation and coverage by analysts and the media, are crucial for inside managers
to have credible ways of conveying hidden firm-specific information to outside investors.
3.1 Average Quoted Spreads
This section discusses the results of regression equation 3 with the average quoted spread, QS, as the depen-
dent variable. It provides us with the first evidence in our investigation.
Table 3 reports the estimation results of our baseline regressions. Examining Table 3, we find that both
GCRSCORE and CIFAR are negatively correlated with the quoted spread, with similar magnitudes (the
10Bid-ask spreads are in general decreasing over time. One well-documented reason for reduction of spreads over time is the
reduction of minimum tick size. NYSE, for example, adjusted the minimum tick size from one eighth to one sixteenth in June 1997,
and further convert to a decimal system beginning in August 2000. NASDAQ and AMEX followed with a similar process.
11Cluster regression does not change coefficient estimates.
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mean of GCRSCORE is 5.4 and the mean of CIFAR is 71), indicating a higher spread for ADRs from
less transparent markets. The coefficient estimate of GCRSCORE is −0.06 with a p-value of 0.11. The
coefficient estimate of CIFAR is −0.01 with a p-value of 0.02. The significance level of GCRSCORE
is relatively weak. This is partly due to the fact that variations of GCRSCORE are smaller relative to
variations in spreads throughout the years. It is also explained by the possibility that survey measures do
not characterize developed markets as well as emerging markets. In our later sub-sample and two-stage
analysis this will transpire more clearly. The coefficient estimate of ANTIDIR is −0.12. The CIV IL
dummy shows a coefficient of 0.42. Both are highly significant. These estimates suggest that firms with
better protection of investor rights, measured either by the anti-director rights or by common-law legal origin
versus civil-law, on average have lower spreads. The result that the legal and governance environment can
affect an ADR firm’s information asymmetry is somewhat counterintuitive at the first blush. But in light of
our discussion that weak investor protection can: (i) reduce a firm’s incentive to voluntarily disclose, (ii)
negatively affect analyst coverage of the firm, and (iii) decrease investors’ desire to be informed about the
firm, then the result isn’t all that surprising.
As expected, the control variables SIZE and MTB, which are often used as proxies of information
asymmetry, are negatively correlated with spreads. Estimates on the U.S. market volatility are insignificant,
which is understandable since we already controlled for yearly average of the spread. More volatile local
markets lead to higher spreads, but the estimates are not significant. Leverage is positively correlated with
spread, consistent with the suggestion that higher degree of information asymmetry leads to higher leverage.
One surprise is that tangibility is positively correlated with the quoted spreads, since higher tangibility often
suggests a lower information asymmetry.
Table 4 focuses on the disclosure variable GCRSCORE, and further examines the robustness of our
baseline results of the quoted-spread regression with various combinations of controls based on our regres-
sion in Table 3. Columns (1) estimates regression with only the firm size, leverage and market-to-book as
controls. Column (2) estimates regression by including market volatilities as additional controls. They show
that the exclusion of TANG or market volatility does not affect the significance of our results. Column (3)
includes an emerging market dummy variable, EM, to the regression. It shows that GCRSCORE absorbs
most of the emerging market factor, but the significance level decreases. Column (4) includes industry fixed
effects; it shows that the industry fixed effect reduces home country disclosure factor but the estimate on
GCRSCORE is still negative and significant at the 10 % level.12 Columns (5), (6), and (7) add CIV IL,
12Industry classification is defined according to 2-digit SIC. Our Fama-Macbeth estimates show that significance of
GCRSCORE is robust to industry fixed effect
14
ANTIDIR, and then both to the list of regressors. The coefficient estimates ofGCRSCORE remain neg-
ative and significant and their magnitude actually increases, indicating that disclosure, although positively
correlated with the governance and the civil-law dummy, is a distinctive factor that affects spreads. The esti-
mates on CIV IL and ANTIDIR remain consistent with those of Table 3 and are significant. Column (8)
and (9) show that home country disclosure effect is robust to controlling of the analyst opinion dispersion and
the analysts coverage. The coefficient estimate on DISPERSION is negative and on NUMANALY S
is positive, consistent with the argument that analysts dispersion of opinion is an indicator of information
asymmetry and that more analyst coverage reduces information asymmetry.
Several authors have argued that ADR firms from markets of different maturity behave differently when
being integrated into the new information environment. Ferreira and Fernandes (2008) find that cross-listing
has an asymmetric impact on stock price informativeness for emerging-market and developed-market firms.
It is therefore of interest to estimate our baseline regressions separately for the EM (Emerging Market) and
the DEV (Developed Market) firms. Table 5 presents the results. For the EM sub-sample, the coefficient
estimate on disclosure and governance variables are slightly higher in magnitudes than the whole sample
(estimate on GCRSCORE, for example, increases from -0.09 for the whole sample to -0.14 for EM sub-
sample), and are highly significant. While for the DEV sub-sample, GCRSCORE estimate is positive
and insignificant, but the coefficient estimate on CIFAR remains negative and significant. It suggests that
survey-based disclosure measure is not as informative an indicator of market transparency for the DEV
markets as it is for the EM markets. Conceptually, it is harder to distinguish matured markets by survey
respondents. Accounting-based “hard” measures are more appropriate for those markets. While for the EM
markets, the accounting-based “hard” measure is not enough to explain the level of market transparency,
probably due to the lack of enforcement of the existing rules. Therefore, for EM firms, the survey-based
measure does a better job. Note also that for our data, GCRSCORE covers more EM countries than
CIFAR. After examining estimates on ANTIDIR and CIV IL, we find that the governance and the
legal origin effects are much larger for the EM firms than for the DEV firms. ANTIDIR and CIV IL
coefficients are −0.17 and 0.45, respectively, for the EM sub-sample, comparing to −0.002 and 0.18 re-
spectively for the DEV sub-sample. CIV IL estimate is significant, but ANTIDIR is not significant for
the DEV firms, suggesting that corporate governance is less of a concern for the DEV firms than the EM
firms. Taken as a whole, results in our sub-sample tests are consistent with the hypothesis that EM ADRs
are subject to the characteristics of the home capital market environment more so than DEV ADRs.
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3.2 Fama-Macbeth Statistical Method
In the above regression method, we utilize a panel approach by correcting for robust regression error, or
adjusting for year and country fixed effects (cluster regression, not reported). If serial correlation in the error
or heteroskedasticity is quite large, however, the above statistical methods might produce false significance.
An alternative solution is to use a Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-stage procedure, which estimates a separate
regression cross-sectionally in each year and then takes the time series mean of the coefficients. The relative
advantage of the Fama-MacBeth procedure is to minimize the serial correlated error and to maximize the
cross-sectional variation in the home country information and institution qualities.
We find that the resulting estimates from the two-stage method largely confirm our earlier results. Ta-
ble 6 reports an example as we reproduce the estimation of Table 3 and 4 using the two-stage regressing
approach. Notice that the U.S. market volatility drops out of the cross sectional regressions. The resulting
GCRSCORE coefficient in Table 6 is −0.12 with a p-value of 0.08 when no additional controls are added.
Its magnitudes increase to around −0.20 and significance increases to levels within 5% when ANTIDIR
or CIV IL or both are added, as well as when analyst dispersion and coverage are controlled. Consistent
with our results in Table 4, magnitude and significance decrease when the industry fixed effects are added.
Coefficient estimate on ANTIDIR is negative, and on CIV IL is positive. They are significant when en-
tering regressions separately. Of the control variables, SIZE, DTA, and MTB have signs as we expected.
One notable difference is that TANG is no longer significant, indicating the existence of autocorrelation in
the panel data. Overall, the Fama-MacBeth method confirms our earlier regression results.13
The Fama-MacBeth method provides with us an opportunity to examine economic significance of home
market effect since it presents direct cross-section comparisons. For a coefficient estimate of −0.20 on
GCRSCORE, average quoted spread decreases by 0.15 (0.73 ∗ (−0.2)) if a firm improves its disclosure
score by one standard deviation (0.73).14 This is economically significant, given that the average quoted
spreads is at 1.71. The hypothetical move reduces the average spread by nearly 10%, all else equal. Simi-
larly, the difference in spreads between a firm from common-law country and civil-law country is 0.2.
Dividing the sample according to emerging and developed markets offers some contrast between the
two (not reported here). The resulting estimates for EM firms are consistent with the estimates of the
full sample, but GCRSCORE coefficient is estimated positive for DEV firms (CIFAR remains negative
13Sub-sample analysis of the Fama-MacBeth approach also confirms our earlier findings. These results are not reported and are
available upon request.
14Bid-ask spreads are in percentages.
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but insignificant). CIV IL estimate again remains positive. The effect of the home market information
opaqueness is mostly driven by the EM firms; the DEV firms are more affected by their legal institutional
differences.
3.3 Robustness: Measure of Information Environment
One drawback of our disclosure proxies is that they are time invariant. While evidence suggests a country’s
information disclosure environment and underlying institutional structure are quite stable, we nevertheless
try to check the robustness of our results with other disclosure proxies. One alternative proxy is the disclo-
sure index reported by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). Their disclosure index is design to
capture the strength of disclosure requirements in security laws.15 Another proxy we use is the business ex-
tent of disclosure index that is reported by the World Bank.16 We use year 2006 value of that index to check
if our result is robust to the recent measure of home capital market disclosure environment. Our finding of
home capital market environment effect is robust to these alternative measures. We do not report results of
these estimates there due to space limitations.
A third measure of the degree of the home market information opaqueness is the R2 measure advocated
by Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006). R2i in a market factor regression can be used as a measure
of the extent to which firm-specific information determines stock price movements, because R2i measures
precisely the percentage of firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility. A high R2i thus indicates
a high degree of stock price co-movement and a low observable idiosyncratic risk. Morck et al. (2000)
find that stocks have higher R2s in countries with less-developed financial markets. Jin and Myers (2006)
confirm that R2 is correlated with a country’s financial opaqueness. Ferreira and Fernandes (2008) use R2-
based measure to show that emerging-market firms that cross-list in the U.S. achieved less improvement in
information environment than their developed-market counterparts.
We follow Jin and Myers (2006) to calculate R2it from the following regression:
riτ = αi + β1irm,jτ + β2irexus,jτ + β3irm,jτ−1 + β4irexus,jτ−1 + β5irm,jτ−2 (4)
+β6irexus,jτ−2 + β7irm,jτ+1 + β8irexus,jτ+1 + β9irm,jτ+2 + β10irexus,jτ+2 + iτ ,
15Specifically, their disclosure index is the arithmetic mean of the following requirements: (1) Prospectus; (2) insiders’ com-
pensation; (3) ownership by large shareholders; (4) inside ownership; (5) contracts outside the normal course of business; and (6)
transactions with related parties. See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) for more details.
16Detailed description of the index is available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodologysurveys/ProtectingInvestors.aspx
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for each firm i included in the DATASTREAM stock database of country j in year t, where riτ is the firm
return, rm,jτ is the local market return from DATASTREAM total return index of the country, rexus,jτ is the
U.S. market index return adjusted by exchange rate. The leads and lags in the regression are to correct for
possible non-synchronous trading. We then average across firms in country j in year t to get our information
measure R2jt, denoted RS, to substitute for disclosure measures in equation 3.
17 If quoted spread captures
the degree of adverse selection, we expect RS to be positively correlated with QS.
Table 7 reports the results of the RS regressions. Through inspection of panel A, we find that the RS
measure confirms our finding in Table 3. The RS coefficient estimate is 1.2 when no additional controls are
added, and it is significant at the 5% level. After industry, governance, and legal origin are controlled for,
respectively, estimates of the RS coefficient remain positive. They are significant except when CIV IL is
added. Panel B and Panel C compare estimation results for the emerging and the developed market sub-
samples. The coefficient estimates of RS for the EM firms are all positive, and are in general much more
pronounced than those of the whole sample. The coefficient of RS in the regression without additional
controls, for example, goes up to 2.18 and is highly significant. In contrast, three of four RS estimates
for the DEV firms are negative. We do not find significantly positive correlation between the spreads and
RS for the DEV sub-sample. This result is consistent with Ferreira and Fernandes’ (2008) finding that
DEV firms have improved their information environment after cross-listing but EM firms do not. Therefore
the EM firms continue to have their degree of adverse selection affected by the home market information
environment while the DEV firms do not. We observe in Panel C, however, that the coefficient estimates of
CIV IL and ANTIDIR for the DEV firms have the expected signs. That is, consistent with Table 5, the
coefficient estimate of CIV IL is positive and the coefficient estimate of ANTIDIR is negative. CIV IL
stays significant for the DEV firms. Overall, our tests with RS as the home market information opaqueness
measure provide evidence that suports a positive relation between the adverse selection in ADR trading and
home market information opaqueness for the emerging market firms. For the developed market firms, the
effects of legal institution on adverse selection withstand, but we do not find a significant effect of the home
market information environment as measured by idiosyncratic informativeness in stock prices.
3.4 Effective Spreads and Adverse Selection Component of Spreads
The quoted bid-ask spread is a raw measurement of trading cost and has its own concerns. The quoted bid-
ask spread may contain measurement problems, or actual trading may take place mostly within the quotes.
17Jin and Myers (2006) show that equally weighted averages perform as well as value-weighted averages.
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Roll (1984) derives a measure of effective spread based on negative autocovariance of security returns, under
the assumption that market makers face only order processing costs. Moreover, Stoll (1989) and others show
that spreads could be decomposed of a non-information component, such as order processing and inventory
holding cost, and an asymmetric information component of adverse selection cost. In our context, weak
home market institution and information opaqueness can potentially lead to an increase of both components
of bid-ask spreads. Higher (unit) processing cost can be a result of less frequent trading, partly due to less
transparent information; higher inventory holding cost also can result from weak institutional protection;
higher trading costs of ADRs from certain countries can be a result of the lack of competition among ex-
changes, which in turn reflects higher local trading costs due to institutional and informational problems. At
the same time, home market information opaqueness and corporate governance, through effect on incentives
to disclose, can lead to higher information component of spreads. Therefore, we are interested in the effect
of the home market environment on both ADRs’ effective spreads and the adverse-selection component of
these spreads.18
We estimate Roll (1984)’s effective spreads and information component of spreads with methods pro-
posed by George et al. (1991). We estimate the former utilizing the difference between returns based on
transaction prices and returns calculated using bid-to-bid prices. In the latter case, the adverse selection com-
ponent of spread is extracted by subtracting the non-information component calculated with auto-covariance
of expected return filtered return series from the yearly average quoted spread. Specifically, we calculate
the non-information component by estimating Sˆi = 200
√−cov(ητ , ητ−1), over a 60-day rolling sample
in year t, where ητ is expectation-filtered transaction return (see George et al. (1991) and Bharath et al.
(2009) for details); we then take the average Sˆi to get the yearly estimates. We are interested in seeing
whether effective spreads and/or the information component of spreads are correlated with our disclosure
and institutional quality measures.
Table 8 and Table 9 report the regression results in which effective spread and adverse selection com-
ponent of the spread are used as dependent variables, respectively. Upon examining the tables, we find a
consistent pattern of difference between the EM and the DEV firms. The emerging market firms are sen-
sitive to disclosure, measured either by GCRSCORE or CIFAR, and to governance proxies; while the
developed market firms are only sensitive to legal origins. In fact, the coefficient of GCRSCORE for the
developed market firms in the effective spread regression appears to be positive.
18We estimate information component of spreads, not proportional information component, because with a big enough spread,
the information component of a stock can still be relatively high even with a low proportional measure.
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In the effective spread regressions, emerging market ADRs’ effective spreads are negatively correlated
with disclosure, measured either by GCRSCORE or CIFAR, and protection of shareholder rights, mea-
sured by ANTIDIR. Slope estimates on GCRSCORE ranges from −0.15 without additional control to
−0.26 when legal origin and investor protection are controlled. GCRSCORE remains a significant factor
after controlling for both CIV IL and ANTIDIR. Slope estimate of ANTIDIR is −0.18 and is highly
significant. CIV IL, the legal origin variable, however, is not significant, and appears to have negative signs
when augmented as a control variable. For the DEV firms, on the other hand, local market opaqueness
does not appear to be a significant factor that increases effective spreads, nor does shareholder protection.19
However, CIV IL is positively and significantly correlated with the effective spread, as expected, indicating
that rule of law based on different legal origins is an important home market factor for firms from developed
markets. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that emerging market ADRs have higher effective
trading cost due to local market conditions.
In the adverse-selection component regression results, reported in Table 9, the EM firms with better lo-
cal market financial disclosure have lower spreads attributed to information asymmetry. Slope estimates on
GCRSCORE ranges from −0.16 to−0.22. GCRSCORE is highly significant without controlling for in-
vestor protection and legal origin, and is significant at 10% level when these are added as controls. CIFAR
has a slope estimate of −0.02 and highly significant. CIV IL and ANTIDIR, in regressions where they
are used separately as the main institutional regressors respectively, are significant and have signs as ex-
pected, but lose significance when used as control variables toGCRSCORE. For the DEV firms, CIFAR
is negatively and significantly correlated with adverse selection component of spreads. GCRSCORE esti-
mates are positive and not significant. Therefore, unlike results in the effective spread regressions, we find
limited evidence that adverse-selection component of spreads of the DEV firms widens with more opaque
home disclosure proxied by accounting standards, albeit less significantly comparing to that of the EM
firms. Coefficient estimates of CIV IL are consistently positive and significant across specifications, again
indicating legal origin is an important factor in determining information cost for DEV firms. ANTIDIR
is not significant in the regression without other controls, and is otherwise positive. In contrast to results in
the effective spread regression, estimates of institutional quality variables for the whole sample all have the
expected signs and are significant. This is understandable, because there are more variations across coun-
tries of emerging and developed markets in the whole sample, thus the power of the tests are higher. It can
19GCRSCORE, in fact, appears to be positively correlated with effective spreads, although not significant. The reason behind
a positive relation between effective spreads and GCRSCORE among DEV firms may be due to ADRs from more transparent
markets being more actively traded and thus have higher order processing cost and more volatile returns, which both contribute
to higher effective spread. When the information asymmetry component of spread is less affected by home market information
environment for DEV ADR firms, effects of other components of the bid-ask spread are likely to dominate.
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also partly due to that DEV firms’ responses of adverse selection component of spreads to disclosure and
governance variables are more “well behaved” than that of effective spreads.
Overall, we conclude that better local legal institution qualities and more transparent information en-
vironment reduce the adverse selection component of trading costs. This effect is more pronounced for
emerging market firms, which display significant effects in both effective trading cost and adverse selection
component of spreads than for developed market firms. For firms from developed markets, local information
disclosure and corporate governance measured by anti-director rights do not appear to adversely affect effec-
tive spreads, instead the rule of law based on different legal origins appears to be the dominant institutional
factor in affecting trading costs. The adverse selection component of spreads of developed market firms are
weakly correlated with domestic institution qualities, but the non-information component is not. Both infor-
mation and non-information component of spreads of emerging market firms are correlated with domestic
institution quality. As a result, the overall sample exhibits correlation between information component of
spreads and home quality of institutions.
3.5 Alternative Information Measure
So far, we have presented empirical evidence that information-based trading is positively correlated with
a more opaque domestic information environment and a poorer institutional quality. More specifically,
bid-ask spreads, and their information component, appear to be higher for ADRs from markets of lower
disclosure, poorer investor protection, and of civil law legal origin, especially for emerging market firms. To
substantiate our interpretation of the relation between information asymmetry of ADR firms and the home
country information and institutional quality, we test for the relation with an alternative adverse selection
measure that is not spread-based as the dependent variable.
Llorente at al. (2002) develop an intensity-of-informed-trading measure that accounts for the trading
volume accompanying stock return autocorrelations. We follow their method and construct our alternative
proxy for each firm-year with resulting coefficient estimates of C2it, denoted C2, from equation 2 for all
NYSE and AMEX listed firms in our sample.20 Within each year, higher values of C2 tend to indicate more
information-based trading and a higher degree of adverse selection.
Results of regressions using C2 (scaled by 100) as the dependent variable are reported in Table 10.
To minimize the error driven by market factor and the complication of between-year comparisons of C2,
20Volume data for NASDAQ firms contains information from after-hour trading and therefore is not as reliable. We also eliminate
firms that have fewer than 60 available observations in a year.
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we estimate with the two-stage regression approach and report the means of the estimates and p-values
of the related T-tests. The results for this alternative measure of stock price informativeness support the
findings that domestic information environment and institutional qualities matter primarily for emerging
market ADRs. The coefficient estimates of GCRSCORE and ANTIDIR for EM firms are negative and
significant, while for DEV firms they are positive. We do not find support that information asymmetry is
related to legal origin with the C2 measure. However, caution should be taken against over-interpreting the
C2 measure results, since the goodness-of-fit is relatively poor. R2 of cross section regressions are at about
5% (consistent with Llorente at al. (2002)).
3.6 Is the Home Country Institution Risk Priced?
With the evidence presented above, that domestic information environment and institutional qualities con-
tinue to affect adverse selection costs of ADRs, especially for emerging market firms, it is natural to ask
the question: Is the risk posed by home country information opaqueness and inadequate institutional quality
priced? Previous research finds evidence that poor shareholder protection (LLSV (2002)) and weak legal
institutions (Lombardo and Pagano (1999)) are penalized with lower valuations. We’ve already seen that
poorer home country institutions are associated with higher capital costs in terms of higher bid-ask spreads
of ADRs. This section presents some preliminary evidence on the valuation effect of the home country
institution risk.
In our context, the task of answering that question is a lot more difficult, because ADR returns also reflect
country factors other than the home country capital market environment. It is difficult to differentiate the
information factor from other country risk factors in our context. Further, occasional bursts of international
financial crisis in emerging markets will likely distort our analysis. Nevertheless, we attempt to provide
some clue to that question by analyzing monthly excess ADR returns. We use returns after 2002 to avoid
complication by international financial crises. We first consider a hedge portfolio similar to Aboody, Hughes,
and Liu (2004). More specifically, we extend the Fama-French three-factor model by using a hedge portfolio
based on home capital market environment factor and substituting a world market return for market return.
We estimate for each firm-year:
rpτ − rfτ = α+ β1(rwdτ − rfτ ) + +β2SMBτ + β3HMLτ + ζτ , (5)
where rpτ is the (equally weighted) monthly hedge portfolio return of going long in ADRs from mar-
kets where GCRSCORE are below the sample median and going short in ADRs from markets where
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GCRSCORE are above the sample median. rfτ is the risk free rate, rwdτ is the U.S. dollar return of world
market index; SMBτ and HMLτ are, respectively, the Fama and French (1992) size and market-to-book
factor returns. We are interested in the estimate of α. A positive estimation of α suggests that lower infor-
mation quality requires compensation via higher expected returns. Regression with monthly returns from
2002 to 2006 gives us an estimation of α of 0.67 with a T-stat of 1.5.
To investigate the question in more depth, we next adopt an approach similar to Easley, Hvidkjaer, and
O’Hara (2002). We first estimate factor loadings with returns of 36 months prior to the month. For each
firm i at month t we estimate:
rτ − rfτ = α+ ωwd(rwdτ − rfτ ) + ωsmbSMBτ + ωhmlHMLτ + ζτ . (6)
We then estimate cross-sectionally (firm subscript is omitted):
rt − rft = λ0,t + λ1,tωˆwd,t + λ2,tωˆsmb,t + λ3,tωˆhml,t + λ4,tHCME + %t, (7)
where HCME are our proxies for home capital market environment. We expect negative estimate of λ4
on GCRSCORE, CIFAR, and ANTIDIR if lower information quality requires higher cost of capital.
Table 11 reports the mean and P-value of T-test of average λ4 loading from 2002 to 2006.
The resulting estimates show GCRSCORE, CIFAR, and ANTIDIR are negatively correlated with
the risk-adjusted excess return, and CIV IL is positively correlated with the risk-adjusted abnormal return.
Lower information transparency, poorer protection of investor rights, and civil law of origin are associated
with a higher cost of capital. Therefore, it suggests that risks due to home market information opaqueness
and lack of investor protection are taken into account by the market. The significance of coefficient esti-
mates in Table 11, however, is relatively weak, with only GCRSCORE being significant at the 10% level.
Nevertheless, it provides us with some idea of the answer to the question. As we cautioned above, these
excess return analysis should be viewed with extra caution, since factors independent of the home capital
market environment effect are difficult to extract. Further research is warranted to draw a more conclusive
answer to the question.
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4 Why does the Home Market Effect Persist?
So far, we have established the evidence that home capital market effect persists after firms listed in the U.S.
One might however wonder why this home capital market effect persists given the evidence in the literature
that firms do improve their information environment and investor protection when they cross-list in the U.S.,
and that that bonding to the U.S. security regime is often cited as one of the reasons that firms cross-list in
the U.S. One possible channel, as discussed above, is the variation in effectiveness of bonding given that
regulatory rules serve only as a floor of reporting practice and different firms have different costs and benefits
of implementation. Another possibility is that firms might revert back to their old practices over time after
they cross-list. In a recent study of deregister decision by cross-listed foreign firms, Doidge, Karolyi, and
Stulz (2008) find evidence that suggest foreign firms are more likely to deregister once the benefit of raising
low-cost capital disappears. A similar channel might contribute to the persistence of home capital market
effect: once foreign firms are listed in the U.S. and the prospect of requiring new capital diminishes, home
capital market characteristics may creep back into ADR firms.
We analyze two pieces of evidence to try to provide some insights. If differences in voluntary disclosure
above regulatory floor is one of the reason that the home capital market effect persists, one would expect
that raising the regulatory floor would attenuate the home capital market effect. We study the effect of
one such tightening in regulatory rules, namely, the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.21 Sarbanes-Oxley,
or SOX, sets new or enhanced disclosure and corporate governance standards for all U.S. publicly traded
firms, including U.S. listed foreign firms. To examine how sox affect the influence of the home capital
market environment on ADRs’ adverse selection, we augment our early regression 3 with a interaction term.
Specifically, we estimate:
ASijt = γ0 + γ1HCMEj + γ2Xjt + γ3Xijt + γ4HCMEj ∗ SOX + µt + υijt, (8)
where SOX is a dummy variable that equals one if the year is on or after 2002, and zero otherwise. If the
raising of regulatory floor does reduce the effect of the home capital market environment on ADR adverse
selection, we should expect to see a smaller home capital market effect after 2002, especially for emerging
market firms. In other words, γ4 is expected to be positive for GCRSCORE, CIFAR, and ANTIDIR;
and positive for CIV IL. The regression results are reported in Table 12. Panel A reports the regression
estimates for the whole sample. The interaction term, γ4, is positive and significant for GCRSCORE and
CIFAR, indicating that SOX mitigates the difference between home disclosure environment of ADR firms
21It is also known as the ’Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act’.
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with enhanced financial disclosure requirement. The coefficient estimate on ANTIDIR interaction term
is also positive but not significant, and the coefficient estimate on CIV IL interaction term is negative and
significant. Panel B and Panel C reports regression estimates for sub-sample of emerging market firms and
developed market firms respectively. Overall, results in Table 12 are consistent with the notion that higher
regulatory requirements can help reduce the influence of home capital market environment for cross-listed
firms, especially for emerging market firms where domestic transparency and corporate governance is not
adequate.22
We next analyze the dynamics of adverse selection cost over years after firms are listed in the U.S.
Specifically, we estimate the coefficient of bid-ask spread on years a firm has been listed in the U.S. after
controlling for annual average of the spreads and other firm-specific characteristics. That is, we augment
our regression equation 3 with dummy variables according to the vintage of the listing. In other words, we
analyze the fluctuations of the spreads according to the vintages of cross-listing. Figure 2 shows the plot of
estimates over the listing years. It shows that bid-ask spread spikes up in the second and third year following
the U.S. listing, and it remains higher for emerging market firms while decreases over time for developed
market firms. Figure 2 suggests that a similar channel as Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2008) suggests could
be at work for the home capital market environment effect. Disclosure and governance qualities deteriorate
and thus adverse-selection costs increase after firms have raised capital in the U.S. market. Our finding that
adverse-selection costs for emerging market ADRs, in contrast to their developed counterpart, remain high
after years of listing is consistent with our earlier finding that EM firms are in general more likely to subject
to their home capital market environment.
In summary, our analysis in this section suggests that (i) regulatory rules serving only as a floor is part of
the reason why home capital market environment effect exists; (ii) raising the regulatory floor has a bigger
impact on emerging market firms than developed market firms; and that (iii) emerging market ADRs are
more likely to suffer from a higher adverse selection cost as the years of listing increases.
5 Conclusion
Cross-listing has increasingly become an important form of raising capital abroad. U.S. investors hold ADRs
as an alternative way to seek the benefit of international diversification (Ammer et al. (2008)). Previous
research on cross-listing finds evidence in support of the bonding theory, which asserts that foreign firms can
22Another possible reason why adverse-selection cost has been reduced following the enaction of SOX is that new firms were to
listed in the U.S. would now list in exchanges who regulate the financial sector with a lighter touch.
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improve their disclosure and governance by cross-listing in the United States in order to bond themselves to
the U.S. security regimes. The degree of effectiveness of such bonding, however, remains an open question.
In this paper, we contribute to the bonding literature by investigating whether the home capital market
environment such as information disclosure and the protection of investor rights remains to have effect on
the degree of information asymmetry of ADRs cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges. Our evidence supports
an affirmative answer to that question, especially for emerging market firms.
We show that both the average quoted bid-ask spread of ADRs and the informational component of the
spread are positively correlated with information opaqueness and poor protection of investor rights in the
capital market environment of the home countries, and this relation is more pronounced among emerging
market ADRs. In other words, the home stigma exists among ADRs traded on the U.S. exchanges. This
home stigma is robust to different measures of home market information environment and different statistical
estimation methods. Our evidence with spread-based measure implies that adverse selection cost in ADRs is
significantly higher for ADRs from less transparent and poorly governed capital markets, and our alternative
non-spread-based measure confirms that the pattern reflects an information problem. In addition, we provide
evidence that this “home stigma” risk appears to be priced by the market. Cross-sectionally, the difference
is significant between firms from emerging markets and firms from more mature capital markets. Among
emerging market ADRs, the connection between the home capital market environment and their adverse
selection in the U.S. trading is much stronger than their developed market counterparts. Indeed, the “home
stigma” problem of emerging market ADRs is so prominent that it also drives their effective spread and
overall trading costs. Information opacity of emerging markets does not appear to be solely due to the
lack of regulation stipulation itself. In fact, the survey-based transparency measure fits them better than
the accounting-rule-based measure, suggesting lack of enforcement of the existing rules. Among developed
market ADRs, the home stigma phenomenon is weaker, but there is evidence that home market accounting
standards and the quality of legal institutions continue to affect their level of adverse section in the U.S.
trading.
Timely and intense financial disclosures, including interpretation and coverage by analysts and the me-
dia, are crucial for inside managers to have credible ways of conveying hidden firm-specific information to
outside investors. Although the regulatory requirements of U.S. listing provide cross-listed firms with an
opportunity to bond with the U.S. market regime, much of the disclosure practice is voluntary and may be
subject to an individual firm’s costs and benefits. Home capital market environments can affect a firm’s in-
centive of adhering to a higher disclosure standard, and therefore affect the level of adverse selection in their
U.S.-listed securities. Our results suggest that this is especially a concern for emerging market firms. Given
26
the fact that bonding to the U.S. security regime is often cited as one of the reasons that firms cross-list in
the U.S., our finding of home stigma appears a bit puzzling. Our further analysis shows that the influence
of the home environment becomes weaker for emerging market firms after Sarbanes-Oxley is enacted. This
piece of evidence is consistent with the theory that raising regulatory floor in the U.S. can help firms whose
disclosure and governance practices are closer to the floor to be less influenced by bad practices at home.
We also find evidence that adverse selection costs increase after an initial period of lower costs following
cross-listing, which is more problematic for emerging market firms whose costs remain higher years after
the listings. This finding is consistent with the notion that foreign firms are more likely to be affected by
poor practices at home once the benefit of raising low-cost capital disappears, and it indicates one possible
reason why home environment affects the adverse selection cost in ADR trading.
Our results have important policy implications. Our results illustrate that cross-listing in the United
States is not a complete substitute for improvement of local information transparency and protection of mi-
nority shareholders. Governments and policymakers should still focus on promoting information disclosure
and improving corporate governance in order to attract capital flows to their countries. Our finding that
quality of governance matters for the information environment also suggests that policies aiming to improve
domestic disclosure should be complemented with policies promoting better investor rights protection.
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Figure 2: Average Bid-ask Spread Over the Vintage of the Listings
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Table 1: Correlation Between the Home Capital Market Environment Measures
This table reports the Spearman correlation coefficient of institution quality proxies. Summary statistics of each proxy are also
reported. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure from Global Competitive Report, and proxies for information transparency.
CIFAR is an accounting-standard-based measure of disclosure. ANTIDIR is a measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a
dummy variable that equals one if a country’s business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it is of common law origin.
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
GCRSCORE 1.00 0.69 0.13 -0.31
CIFAR 0.69 1.00 0.36 -0.43
ANTIDIR 0.13 0.36 1.00 -0.64
CIVIL -0.31 -0.43 -0.64 1.00
Mean 5.41 71.23 3.03 0.73
Std 0.73 8.91 1.31 0.45
Median 5.65 73.00 3.00 1.00
N 34 31 33 33
Table 2: Summary Statistics on ADRs
This table reports the summary statistics for our sample of level II and III ADRs. Means of quoted spread, log size, tangibility,
DTA, and MTB of firms from different sub-sample of markets are reported, as well as the means and standard deviations of the
whole sample. p-value of T-test of difference in means are reported in parentheses. SIZE is logarithmic of firm size, TANG is
percentage of tangible assets in total assets, DTA is the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio.
Quoted Spread SIZE TANG DTA MTB
GCRSCORE ≥Median 1.72 7.70 0.32 0.26 1.93
GCRSCORE < Median 1.75 7.95 0.46 0.27 1.70
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.52) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.30)
CIFAR ≥Median 1.70 7.63 0.34 0.26 1.95
CIFAR < Median 1.86 8.05 0.40 0.27 1.68
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.20)
ANTIDIR ≥Median 1.70 7.70 0.38 0.27 2.02
ANTIDIR < Median 1.79 8.03 0.40 0.26 1.49
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01)
COMMON 1.63 7.28 0.34 0.25 2.68
CIVIL 1.83 8.04 0.38 0.27 1.46
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.19) (0.00)
Emerging Market Firms 1.80 7.81 0.49 0.27 1.62
Developed Market Firms 1.67 7.84 0.29 0.25 2.01
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.05) (0.65) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
Sample Mean 1.71 7.82 0.39 0.26 1.82
Sample Standard Deviation 1.47 1.73 0.27 0.2 3.87
Number of Observation 1909 1909 1905 1909 1879
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Table 3: Quoted Bid-Ask Spread and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the estimates of average quoted spread on institution quality measures of home capital markets. GCRSCORE is a
survey-based measure from Global Competitive Report, and proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is a accounting-standard-
based measure of disclosure. ANTIDIR is a measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a dummy variable that equals one
if a country’s business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it is of common law origin. SIZE is logarithmic of firm size, TANG
is percentage of tangible assets in total assets, DTA is the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio. P-values are
calculated with White robust errors and reported in parentheses. Error Degree of Freedom and adjusted R-squares are also reported
at the bottom. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept 4.97c 5.73c 4.86c 4.51c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Disclosure and Governance −0.09b −0.02c −0.10c 0.35c
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Market Volatility 0.09 −0.11 0.06 −0.21
(0.92) (0.91) (0.95) (0.82)
Local Market Volatility 0.003 0.05a 0.002 0.003
(0.46) (0.06) (0.64) (0.54)
SIZE −0.31c −0.32c −0.32c −0.33c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.30c 0.24b 0.40c 0.32c
(0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01)
DTA 1.06c 1.07c 1.06c 1.06c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.06c −0.06c −0.06c −0.06c
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
EDF 1785 1596 1622 1622
Adj. R-square 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39
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Table 8: Effective Spread and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the estimates of effective spreads on measures of home capital market environment. Panel A reports the regression
results of the whole sample. Panel B reports the regression results of the emerging market firms sub-sample. Panel C reports the
regression results of the developed market firms sub-sample. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure from Global Competitive
Report, and proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is an accounting-standard-based measure of disclosure. ANTIDIR is a
measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s business law is of civil law origin,
and zero if it is of common law origin. SIZE is logarithmic of firm size, TANG is percentage of tangible assets in total assets, DTA
is the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio. NUMANALYS is measured as the number of analysts following
of that specific year. DISPERSION is dispersion of analyst EPS forecast measured as standard deviation of analysts forecast in
months of calendar year prior to the end of fiscal year, and normalized by absolute value of realized EPS and square root of the
number of analysts. P-values are calculated with White robust errors and reported in parentheses. Error Degree of Freedom and
adjusted R-squares are also reported at the bottom. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: ALL Firms
Intercept 3.49c 4.31c 3.43c 3.72c 4.37c 4.13c 4.14c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE -0.03 −0.10b −0.09a −0.09a
(0.44) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
CIFAR -0.01
(0.00)
US Market Volatility 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.49 0.32 -1.10 -1.27
(0.65) (0.76) (0.76) (0.60) (0.74) (0.26) (0.19)
Local Market Volatility 0.003 0.060 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.55) (0.02) (0.66) (0.94) (0.79) (0.78) (0.75)
SIZE −0.32c −0.34c −0.34c −0.34c −0.35c −0.24c −0.24c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.22b 0.14 0.23b 0.30c 0.28b 0.24b 0.17
(0.04) (0.23) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.22)
DTA 0.76c 0.76c 0.76c 0.78c 0.82c 0.41c 0.33b
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
MTB −0.04c −0.03c −0.03c −0.03c −0.03c −0.01a −0.01a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.09)
CIVIL 0.17c -0.03 0.11 0.11
(0.01) (0.67) (0.11) (0.15)
ANTIDIR −0.09c −0.07c −0.05b -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.16)
Dispersion 0.10a 0.09a
(0.08) (0.10)
Number of Analysts −0.02c −0.02c
(0.00) (0.00)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EDF 1769 1581 1607 1607 1579 1123 1115
Adj. R-square 0.281 0.282 0.278 0.285 0.290 0.325 0.333
Panel B: Emerging Market Firms
Intercept 3.57c 4.54c 2.88c 3.52c 4.99c 5.47c 5.63c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE −0.15c −0.26a -0.14 -0.17
(0.01) (0.10) (0.33) (0.26)
CIFAR −0.02c
(0.00)
US Market Volatility 1.48 2.04 1.98 2.05 1.99 -1.35 -1.21
(0.29) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.46) (0.50)
continued on next page
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Local Market Volatility 0.06b 0.05a 0.07b 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.31) (0.31) (0.66) (0.85)
SIZE −0.37c −0.41c −0.38c −0.40c −0.44c −0.29c −0.32c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.29a 0.10 0.08 0.29 0.45b 0.15 0.53b
(0.08) (0.64) (0.67) (0.13) (0.02) (0.39) (0.03)
DTA 1.25c 1.43c 1.36c 1.23c 1.51c 1.24c 0.97c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.03c −0.03b −0.03b −0.02b −0.03c −0.08c -0.05
(0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16)
CIVIL 0.01 −0.28a -0.19 -0.25
(0.93) (0.09) (0.27) (0.16)
ANTIDIR −0.18c −0.13b −0.12b -0.08
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16)
Dispersion 0.05 0.04
(0.41) (0.49)
Number of Analysts −0.03c −0.02b
(0.01) (0.02)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EDF 846 695 706 706 678 489 481
Adj. R-square 0.268 0.253 0.244 0.281 0.300 0.368 0.402
Panel c: Developed Market Firms
Intercept 3.07c 4.14c 3.73c 3.74c 2.16b 1.53a 1.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.09) (0.34)
GCRSCORE 0.09 0.21a 0.20a 0.26b
(0.38) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03)
CIFAR -0.01
(0.24)
US Market Volatility -0.33 -1.03 -0.62 -0.66 -0.86 -0.17 -0.94
(0.77) (0.37) (0.59) (0.57) (0.45) (0.30) (0.40)
Local Market Volatility 0.004 0.380c 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.01
(0.47) (0.01) (0.98) (0.64) (0.37) (0.22) (0.32)
SIZE −0.31c −0.32c −0.33c −0.31c −0.34c −0.22c −0.23c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.28a 0.33b 0.01
(0.34) (0.41) (0.16) (0.40) (0.10) (0.04) (0.97)
DTA 0.47c 0.52c 0.55c 0.47c 0.52c 0.00 -0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.96) (0.25)
MTB −0.04c −0.03c −0.04c −0.04c −0.04c -0.01 −0.01a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.08)
CIVIL 0.18b 0.53c 0.51c 0.49c
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ANTIDIR 0.01 0.12c 0.09b 0.06
(0.64) (0.00) (0.03) (0.19)
Dispersion 0.48c 0.53c
(0.01) (0.01)
Number of Analysts −0.03c −0.02c
(0.00) (0.00)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EDF 904 867 882 882 880 611 603
Adj. R-square 0.305 0.313 0.311 0.307 0.320 0.345 0.352
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Table 9: Adverse-Selection Component of Spreads and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the estimates of adverse selection component of spreads on measures of home capital market environment. Panel
A reports the regression results of the whole sample. Panel B reports the regression results of the emerging market firms sub-
sample. Panel C reports the regression results of the developed market firms sub-sample. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure
from Global Competitive Report, and proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is an accounting-standard-based measure of
disclosure. ANTIDIR is a measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s
business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it is of common law origin. SIZE is logarithmic of firm size, TANG is percentage of
tangible assets in total assets, DTA is the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio. NUMANALYS is measured as
the number of analysts following of that specific year. DISPERSION is dispersion of analyst EPS forecast measured as standard
deviation of analysts forecast in months of calendar year prior to the end of fiscal year, and normalized by absolute value of realized
EPS and square root of the number of analysts. P-values are calculated with White robust errors and reported in parentheses. Error
Degree of Freedom and adjusted R-squares are also reported at the bottom. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: ALL Firms
Intercept 0.72 1.12 1.56 1.37 1.27
(0.94) (0.91) (0.88) (0.90) (0.90)
GCRScore −0.10c −0.11b
(0.00) (0.02)
CIFAR −0.01c
(0.00)
US Market Volatility 4.98 4.92 2.77 3.58 4.10
(0.72) (0.73) (0.85) (0.80) (0.77)
Local Market Volatility 0.004 0.040 0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.29) (0.12) (0.29) (0.29) (0.58)
SIZE −0.24c −0.25c −0.26c −0.25c −0.26c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.17a 0.14 0.19a 0.25b 0.17
(0.10) (0.20) (0.07) (0.02) (0.12)
DTA 0.84c 0.82c 0.81c 0.81c 0.85c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.08c −0.08c −0.07c −0.08c −0.07c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CIVIL 0.32c 0.25c
(0.00) (0.00)
ANTIDIR −0.06c 0.00
(0.00) (0.98)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EDF 1470 1316 1340 1340 1316
Adj. R-square 0.486 0.448 0.459 0.452 0.461
Panel B: Emerging Market Firms
Intercept 5.47c 6.57c 4.45c 5.26c 5.98c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRScore −0.16c −0.22a
(0.00) (0.10)
CIFAR −0.02c
(0.00)
US Market Volatility -0.20 -0.35 -0.22 -0.23 -0.24
(0.73) (0.58) (0.72) (0.71) (0.70)
Local Market Volatility 0.030 0.020a 0.040 0.010 0.020
(0.15) (0.33) (0.10) (0.60) (0.37)
SIZE −0.31c −0.34c −0.31c −0.33c −0.35c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.00 -0.19 -0.20 -0.10 0.04
continued on next page
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.99) (0.24) (0.22) (0.55) (0.83)
DTA 1.19c 1.25c 1.10c 1.24c 1.21c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.15c −0.17c −0.14c −0.14c −0.14c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CIVIL 0.34c 0.21
(0.01) (0.14)
ANTIDIR −0.12c -0.05
(0.00) (0.31)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EDF 704 583 593 593 569
Adj. R-square 0.610 0.562 0.561 0.574 0.577
Panel C: Developed Market Firms
Intercept 2.26 2.64 2.39 2.17 2.43
(0.83) (0.80) (0.00) (0.83) (0.81)
GCRScore 0.01 0.10
(0.90) (0.38)
CIFAR −0.01c
(0.01)
US Market Volatility 1.18 1.89 0.99 1.30 -0.46
(0.93) (0.89) (0.94) (0.93) (0.97)
Local Market Volatility 0.010 0.050 0.005 0.010 0.010
(0.17) (0.73) (0.25) (0.11) (0.13)
SIZE −0.20c −0.20c −0.22c −0.20c −0.23c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.16 0.28a
(0.29) (0.26) (0.13) (0.32) (0.08)
DTA 0.50c 0.55c 0.57c 0.50c 0.55c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.06c −0.05c −0.06c −0.06c −0.06c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CIVIL 0.18b 0.45c
(0.02) (0.00)
ANTIDIR 0.00 0.10c
(0.88) (0.01)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EDF 716 730 730 730 728
Adj. R-square 0.358 0.366 0.361 0.361 0.372
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Table 10: C2 Adverse Selection Measure and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the estimates of alternative non-spread based adverse selection measure on measures of home capital market
environment. Panel A reports the regression results of the whole sample. Panel B reports the regression results of the emerging
market firms sub-sample. Panel C reports the regression results of the developed market firms sub-sample. Dependant Variable
C2 is estimated from the coefficients c2it of rit(τ) = c0it + c1itrit(τ − 1) + c2itTit(τ − 1)rit(τ − 1) + εit(τ), where rit
is the stock return of ADR i in year t, τ is an indicator for days in year t, Tit(τ) is the natural logarithm of the daily turnover
detrended by its mean over the past 200 observations. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure from Global Competitive Report,
and proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is a accounting-standard based measure of disclosure. ANTIDIR is a measure
of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s business law is of civil law origin, and
zero if it is of common law origin. SIZE is logarithmic of firm size, TANG is percentage of tangible assets in total assets, DTA is
the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio. The regressions are estimated cross-sectionally for each year, and the
mean of resulting estimates are reported. P-value in parentheses are referenced from T-distribution. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All Firms
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept 0.08 -0.08 0.51 1.25
(0.96) (0.98) (0.80) (0.48)
Disclosure and Governance 0.25 0.02 0.07 -0.47
(0.12) (0.43) (0.59) (0.33)
SIZE -0.31 −0.34a -0.26 -0.28
(0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.15)
DTA 1.11 0.67 1.32 1.47
(0.50) (0.70) (0.48) (0.43)
MTB −0.40b −0.34b −0.39b −0.41b
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Panel B: Emerging Market Firms
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept 8.41c 5.45 5.37c 3.60a
(0.01) (0.25) (0.01) (0.07)
Disclosure and Governance −0.68a -0.01 −0.31a 0.07
(0.06) (0.75) (0.06) (0.92)
SIZE −0.73c −0.70c −0.68c −0.63c
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
DTA 0.39 0.77 0.96 1.50
(0.80) (0.65) (0.56) (0.39)
MTB −0.70a -0.61 −0.76a -0.66
(0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11)
Panel C: Developed Market Firms
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept −7.29a 1.09 -0.83 -0.14
(0.07) (0.81) (0.74) (0.96)
Disclosure and Governance 1.29a 0.00 0.45a -0.20
(0.08) (0.99) (0.08) (0.68)
SIZE -0.16 -0.28 -0.22 -0.16
(0.51) (0.29) (0.32) (0.54)
DTA 2.09 1.78 2.16 2.35
(0.38) (0.43) (0.37) (0.32)
MTB −0.55c -0.33 −0.52b 0.40a
(0.01) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07)
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Table 11: Excess ADR Returns and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the time series (monthly) means of λ4, the loadings on home capital market environment. λ4,t of each month
from 2002 to end of 2006 are estimated from
rt − rft = λ0,t + λ1,tωˆwd,t + λ2,tωˆsmb,t + λ3,tωˆhml,t + λ4,tHCME + %t,
where HCME are our proxies for home capital market environment. ωˆwd,t, ωˆsmb,t, and ωˆhml,t are estimates for each firm month
from
rτ − rfτ = α+ ωwd(rwdτ − rfτ ) + ωsmbSMBτ + ωhmlHMLτ + ζτ ,
with 36 months of data prior to the month. rwdτ is the U.S. dollar return of world market index; SMBτ and HMLτ are, respec-
tively, the Fama-French (1992) size and market-to-book factor returns. P-value in parentheses are referenced from T-distribution.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
GRCSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Disclosure and Governance −0.51a -0.02 -0.18 0.63
(0.06) (0.51) (022) (0.18)
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